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I. INTRODUCTION

Louisiana faces a dilemma. On one hand, it can continue
following its current impossibility doctrine and thereby stay true to
two hundred years of French influence. On the other hand, it can
broaden its basis of excuse for non-performance, thereby bringing
itself in line with many other legal systems. In either event,
Louisiana will have to step back and evaluate how it approaches
legal development, either through strict adherence to historical
ideas or through progressive applications attempting to balance law
and contemporary issues.
For hundreds of years, two separate ideals have battled to
control the policy behind this area of the law; pacta sunt
servanda,2 which calls for the absolute adherence to terms in a
contract, and rebus sic stantibus,3 which holds that when things
change, those terms collapse. At various times throughout history,
each of these ideals has ridden at the forefront of popular legal
thought. While one was in the spotlight, the other would be cast
aside. Thus, the two have been trapped in a proverbial tug of war,
fighting for dominance as centuries slowly pass.

2.

"Contracts must be honored." Safil Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failureof

Cause and Theorie de I'Imprevision: Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L.

REv. 1, 4 (1985).
3. "Provided the circumstances remain unchanged." Id. at 3.
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The purpose of this Comment is to inject a sense of equity into
Louisiana law.4 That is not to say that Louisiana law does not
currently contain equitable notions-it does; however, certain
aspects of the law seem to be stuck in an archaic world that has
long since passed. Imposing harsh laws on the public may make
for easy legal analysis, but it does not always provide a fair result
for the common citizen. The time has come for Louisiana to
overlay its current articles on impossibility with a renewed sense of
equity and good faith.
This Comment proposes a set of articles that would broaden
Louisiana's basis of excuse for non-performance of a contractual
obligation. First, it is necessary to evaluate how Louisiana's
current law of impossibility came to be, as well as the alternative
Second, this
method utilized by numerous legal systems.
Comment analyzes why the current Louisiana law is inadequate in
dealing with contemporary problems and how recent events call
for a new approach. Next, the proposed articles are introduced,
with their application being compared to approaches taken in other
legal systems. Finally, after a short discussion of economic
implications, this Comment addresses a common argument against
the proposed "more lenient" approach.
II. BACKGROUND
The following lays the foundation necessary to understand both
the conflicts and purposes of the strict and relaxed views of excuse
for contractual non-performance. Before seeing where we need to
go, it is necessary to first see where we have been. The past is of
no use if we do not learn from it.

4. Professor Alain Levasseur informed me that I should be careful when
using the term "equity." Interview with Professor Alain Levasseur, Hermann
Moyse, Sr. Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, in Baton Rouge, La.
(Oct. 31, 2006). Equity in the Louisiana Civil Code governs only when there is
an absence of either legislation or custom. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2007).
Therefore, I use the word "equity" as being analogous to "fairness"-perhaps
more in a natural law sense.
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A. The Origins of Louisiana'sImpossibility Excuse (Pacta Sunt
Servanda)
Currently in Louisiana, impossibility of performance is
contained in its own section of the Louisiana Civil Code in the
chapter on "Extinction of Obligations." 5 Pursuant to these articles,
an obligor's failure to perform an obligation is excused only when:
(1) performance is absolutely impossible; 6 (2) the impossibility is
preceded by a fortuitous event; 7 (3) the risk of this fortuitous event
has not been assumed by the obligor;8 (4) the obligor is not in
default when the fortuitous event occurs; 9 and finally, (5) the
obligor is free from fault.'0 Thus, it is only when all of these
requirements are met that an obligor may be excused for failing to
perform an obligation.
Although impossibility covers all obligations in Louisiana,
both scholars and lawyers have argued that courts should recognize
an expanded view of excuse when dealing with contractual
obligations."I
Despite these attempts, Louisiana courts have
refused to expand impossibility, even in situations where the
obligor's performance has become exceedingly difficult after the
contract's execution. 12 In effect, Louisiana has stayed true to the
strict adherence to contractual terms inherited from its French
ancestors. 13
5. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. III, ch. 6, § 2 (2007).
6. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1873 (2007); Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Art. 1873.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Martin Forest Prods. v. Grantadams, 616 So. 2d 251, 254-55
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting appellant's argument that performance of a
consent decree should be excused for commercial impracticability); Hannover
Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988) (holding that impracticability and imprevision are not recognized in
Louisiana); Litvinoff, supranote 2, at 58-59.
12. See, e.g., Martin Forest,616 So. 2d at 254-55; Hannover, 521 So. 2d at
1240.
13. Louisiana adopted its strict notion of impossibility from article 1147 of
the Code Napoleon. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 1. The French Code Napoleon
was adopted at a time when the classical period of contract had a strong hold on
Europe.
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
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This strict adherence to contractual terms is the product of
centuries of legal development and is also called pacta sunt
servanda ("contracts must be honored"). 14 Its origins can be traced
to the Roman praetors' promise of pacta conventa servabo ("I will
respect the agreement").15 It was the medieval canon lawyers (jus
canonicus), however, who spurred the creation of the doctrine
known today. 16 Oddly enough, the development of this doctrine is
not as clear cut as the rule it embodies.
The Church's involvement with the doctrine was mainly
concerned with sin. 17 According to the Church, a promise was
binding before God regardless of its formalities. 18 Therefore, a
breach of an oral promise was no less sinful than a breach of an
oath or contract. 19 In order to harmonize the law with this view, it
became necessary to give all informal promises the binding effect
of a formal oath. 20 This idea was subsequently included in both
the Decretum
Gratiani(Gratian's Decretum) and the Decretals of
21
IX.
Gregory

579 (1990). This "classical" view
maintained the supremacy of a party's contractual freedom. Id.
14. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 4.
15. See generally ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 543, 576-82.
16. Id. at 576.
17. Id. at 542.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Decretals are the written decisions of popes about points or
questions of canon law. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 49
(1999). Although not a pope but only a mere monk, Gratian's explanations of
his work Concordantia discordantium canonum, which was an authoritative
collection of canon law, became known as his Decretum. Id. Gregory IX, who
was a pope, later published extracts of papal decretals outside of what was
covered under Gratian's Dectretum; therefore, it was known as the Liber extra.
Id. at 50-51. These texts, combined with other scholarly works, were combined
to form the Corpus iuris canonici (Body of the canon law). Id. This body of
canon law was considered on equal footing with Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis.
Id. Interestingly, Gratian's Decretum was considered so authoritative that it
became the subject of its own glossaes. Id. at 49. It was one of these glossaes
which provided kindling for the more lenient and equitable solution of rebus sic
stantibus, which has continuously been at battle with pacta sunt servanda ever
since. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 579-80; Hernany Veytia, The
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
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Expounding on this Church-based idea, the natural lawyers
provided the analytical leap necessary to form the current view of
pacta sunt servanda.22 They took the canonist view one step
farther by finding that since fides (faith) is the foundation 'of
" 23
justice, all promises must be binding "under all circumstances.
that formed the foundation for the
Thus, it was this mutation 24
"classical" theory of contract.
Nevertheless, this strict adherence to contractual terms has
never been an absolute rule. Even in the Roman law, pacta sunt
servandawas not without exceptions. 25 As the law developed, the
26
excuse of impossibility was seen as one of those exceptions.
This excuse became recognized in France and was included in the
27
Code Napoleon, where it was then transferred to Louisiana.

Requirement of Justice and Equity in Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1191, 1203
(1995) (conflicts between the differing theories have always seemed to escalate
immediately following horrendous events).
22. ZIMMERMANN, supranote 13, at 544.
23. Id. at 544, 576-77 (emphasis added).
24. Id.at 576-77; see also Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 4.
25. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 578. Roman law allowed locatio
conduction rei contracts to be unilaterally terminated for failure to perform;
mandatum (mandate) could be terminated through revocation or renunciation;
societas (partnership) was also subject to renunciation; and a sale could be
rescinded under an actio redhibitoria(action in redhibition). Id.
26. Id.at 794; see also Dionysios P. Flambouras, The Doctrines of
Impossibility of Performance and Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus in the 1980
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and the Principles
of European Contract Law-A ComparativeAnalysis, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV.
261, 262 (2001). Like Louisiana's current law of impossibility, under the ius
commune the impossibility must have been caused by a fortuitous event (casus
fortuitus). ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 794; see also LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 1873 (2007).
27. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1933 (1947) (historical note) (explaining
that the introduction of impossibility in Louisiana came from articles 1146-48
of the Code Napoldon); Litvinoff, supra note 2, at I (explaining that Louisiana
adopted impossibility as an excuse in article 1933(2) of the Code of 1870 based
on the French article 1147 in the Code Napoleon). This author realizes that
Louisiana substantive law was provided by the Siete Partidasand supposedly
only used the French form. J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of Le Droit
Civil and El Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV.
1019, 1026 (2003). But see Shael Herman, Under My Wings Every Thing
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Thus, Louisiana's current law of impossibility is the culmination of
a long history of legal development, the origins of which predate
Justinian's Digest.
B. The Foundationfor Expanding Louisiana's Excuse (Rebus Sic
Stantibus)
Like Louisiana's impossibility excuse, the expansion argument
can also boast of a rich legal pedigree. Known today as rebus sic
stantibus ("provided circumstances remain unchanged"), the
foundations of this idea can be traced to Plato during the time of
the Roman Republic. 28 It was the Moral Philosophers, however,
who prompted its legal use.
St. Augustine took up Cicero's example of "a sword which
does not have to be returned to a depositor who has become
insane" and included it in his teachings. 29 This idea of a changed
circumstance was then included in Gratian's Decretum, a gloss of
which provided the spark for the modem rebus sic stantibus
doctrine. 30 After affirmation by St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural

Prospers: Reflections upon Vernon Palmer's The Louisiana Civilian
Experience-Critiquesof Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction,80 TUL. L. REV.
1491, 1500 (2006). Here, the wording of the French article was used in the
Digest of 1808; therefore, an analysis of the French law is more appropriate.
28.

PLATO, REPUBLIC 7-8 (Allan Bloom trans., 1991) (360 B.C.).

Some

contemporary writers have stated that "the example of a sword which does not
have to be returned to a depositor who has become insane," which was an
influential basis for the current idea of rebus sic stantibus, can only be traced
back to Cicero in the first century B.C. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 579.
That same example, however, is found in the much earlier work of Plato's
Republic. See PLATO, supra. Thus, the foundations for rebus sic stantibus can
be found as far back as the fourth century B.C.
29. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 579. Evidence of this use can be found
in the Enarrationes in Psalmos, V, 7, which is a collection of St. Augustine's
sermons. Id. at 579 & n.240; see Enarrationes in Psalmos, http://www.augnet.
org/default.asp?ipageid= 1343 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). It should be mentioned
once again that attributing this example to Cicero is not totally accurate since the
example was included in Plato's Republic roughly three centuries earlier.
PLATO, supra note 28, at 7-8.

30.

ZIMMERMANN, supranote 13, at 580; see also Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 4.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

lawyers picked up the idea and began to expand it.3 1 This
expansion resulted in the Romanist writers seeing rebus -sic
32
stantibus as an implied condition in every contract.
From the Roman Empire to present, public opinion, and
therefore popularity, of the doctrine has been subject to a
rollercoaster effect. The doctrine's highpoint for popular opinion
occurred during the seventeenth century. 33 It was during this
period that rebus sic stantibus made its furthest inroads into the
private law, becoming "part and parcel of the usus modernus"
(modem use).34 This popularity was short lived; however, due to
31.

ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 580. It was Bartolus who introduced

rebus sic stantibus into the civil law as an implied condition, limited to only the
act of renuntiatio. Id. Baldus took this idea and enlarged it to cover all
obligations. Id. St. Thomas Aquinas gives a very clear explanation of the
Church's view in his Summa Theologica, stating:
A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises,
because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he
does not act to keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in
changing his mind. He may, however, be excused ... if circumstances
have changed with regard to persons or the business at hand. For, as
Seneca states, for a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary
for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in
promising--since he promised what he had in his mind, due to
circumstances being taken for granted-nor was he faithless in not
keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same.
Hence, the apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had
promised to go . . . did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which

prevented him.
2 AQUINAS, supranote 1, pt. 2, Q. 110, art. 3, reply to obj. 5, at 1667.
32. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 3; see also SAOL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS §
16.72, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 560 (1st ed. 1992); ZIMMERMANN,

supra note 13, at 580. The full text of the clause is "Contractus qui habent
tractum succesivum et dependentiam de futurum, rebus sic stantibus
intelligentur," which may be freely translated as, "Contracts providing for
successive acts of performance over a future period of time must be understood
as subject to the condition that the circumstances will remain the same."
Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 4.
33. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 581. Zimmerman muses that perhaps
the reason for the popularity of the doctrine during the seventeenth century was
in part due to the horrendous wars taking place at the time. Id.
34. Id. An Italian friend, Andrea Borroni, informed me that the usus
modernus is founded on deeper roots. It actually stands for the usus modernus
pandectarum, which is a method of thinking established in Germany. Between
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the rise of the theories of capitalism and liberalism during the
eighteenth century, both of which were particularly hostile to this
equitable notion.3 5 Eventually, the changing
legal scene led to the
36
disappearance of the doctrine altogether.
With the rise of the World Wars in the early part of the
twentieth century, rebus sic stantibus re-emerged as a workable
theory in many jurisdictions. The Italians have codified the idea in
their civil code.3 7 Both Germany's BGB and Greece's Civil Code
contain a provision based on the doctrine. 38 Russia, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan have followed the trend by codifying the
doctrine. 39 Spain and Poland have allowed the theory
jurisprudentially. 40 Puerto Rico found that the doctrine was
embodied under its existing code article on good faith. 4' France
has accepted the idea in its public law.42 Perhaps most profoundly,

1804, when the French Civil Code was initiated, and 1900, when the German
BGB was initiated, a large change took place. The German codification was not
based on the French system, but influenced by a common law based on German
customs and Roman law. Thus, modern usus actually refers to the pandectistic
school of thinking that grew out of the historical school, which began with
Savigny.
Telephone Interview with Andrea Borroni, Italian lawyer, in
Somaglia, Italy (Oct. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Borroni Interview].
35. Borroni Interview, supra note 34; Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 4.
36. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 581.
37. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1467 (Mario Beltramo et al. eds. & trans., 1969)
(Italy), reprintedinfra app.
38. Bfrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Jan. 1, 2002, §§ 275, 313
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BGB.htm, reprinted
infra app.; Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 53 (explaining that Greece now recognizes
frustration of contract in its civil code article 388).
39. Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 451 (Christopher Osakwe
trans., 2000) (Russ.), reprinted infra app.; Turkmenistan Civil Code of
Saparmurat Turkmenbashi [TCC] art. 409 (William E. Butler ed. & trans.,
Simmonds & Hill 1999) (Turkm.), reprinted infra app.; Civil Code of the
Republic of Uzbekistan [RUCC] art. 383 (W.E. Butler trans., Simmonds & Hill
1999) (Uzb.), reprintedinfra app.
40. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 52, 54.
41. Id. at 56-57.
42. Jean-Louis Baudouin, Theory of Imprevision and JudicialIntervention
to Change a Contract,in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 151, 15859 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1969). In France, the theorie de l'imprevision is
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large projects such as the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL), the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform
Commercial Code all contain express
provisions based on an
43
underlying rebus sic stantibus theory.
This sudden re-emergence of the doctrine may indicate a coup
against the strictness of pacta sunt servanda. Interwoven with the
notions of good faith and failure of cause,44 rebus sic stantibus has
been an active player in contract law for many centuries. Despite
attempts to wipe it out, the doctrine still has a strong presence in
the law. Its popularity seems to always increase after catastrophic
events that alter contractual-based assumptions. 45 The ebb and
flow of the doctrine's popularity has best been summarized by the
German Jurist Bernhard Windscheid, who stated: "Thrown
out by
46
window.
the
through
re-enter
always
will
it
the door...
III. WHY DOES LouIsIANA NEED TO CHANGE?
After tracing the foundations of Louisiana's current law, it is
necessary to evaluate why that law is not able to effectively handle

recognized only in adminstratve law and has been rejected under the civil law.
Id.
43.

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

arts. 6.2.1-3 (Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law 2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2
004.pdf, reprintedinfra app. [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES]; PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 6.111 (Comm'n on Euro. Contract Law 1998),
available at http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission-on-european-contractlaw
/PECL%20engelsk/engelskpartlogl.htm, reprinted infra app. [hereinafter
PECL]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265, 272 (1981),

reprintedinfra app.; U.C.C. § 2-615 (2004), reprintedinfra app. This author
would like to note that this list of jurisdictions and law is only illustrative. It in
no way should be taken as an exhaustive list of legal bodies that invoke rebus
sic stantibus.

44. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 6, 16.
45. Veytia, supra note 21, at 1203.
46. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 581 (citing Windscheid "Die
Voraussetzung" (1892) 78 Archiv.fur die civilistische Praxis 197). Windscheid
was a member of the commission who drafted the BGB. Borroni Interview,
supra note 34.
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contemporary problems.
Louisiana's current excuse of
impossibility is inadequate for the following reasons: (1) Louisiana
has experienced a catastrophic event similar to those that have
spurred other jurisdictions to move away from the "classical"
contract doctrine; (2) Louisiana is legally isolating itself from
many of its commercial partners by refusing to acknowledge a
broader basis of excuse; and (3) it is more economically efficient
to allow a broader basis of excuse.
A. CatastrophicEvents
Applying a strict, bright-line rule is easy in times of economic
stability and predictability. However, when events occur that
shatter that presupposed stability, the gap between the strict letter
of the law and a fair result can become a chasm. That is why the
more equitable notion of rebus sic stantibus gains support
immediately after drastic events; circumstances change so that it
does not make sense to hold people to certain obligations. This
can be seen time and time again throughout history.47
Germany faced this problem immediately following World
War I. The value of German currency plummeted after the war
and crippled the economy.4 8 Their code contained a strict view of
impossibility, which embodied a pacta sunt servanda foundation
similar to the French tradition; therefore, the code provided no
express method of reaching an equitable solution for debtors
affected by only an economic crisis.4 9 In order to reach an
equitable solution, the courts expanded good faith (Treu und
Glauben) and created the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschdfisgrundlage (collapse of the underlying basis of the
transaction). This jurisprudential doctrine is similar to the idea of

47. See Veytia, supra note 21, at 1203 (asserting that the doctrines of rebus
sic stantibus and pacta sunt servanda reach greater conflict following events
that collapse basic contractual assumptions).
48. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 19-20; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 582;
Baudouin, supra note 42, at 155.
49. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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failure of cause, allowing for judicial revision of a contract.5 0 In
2002, Germany codified this doctrine in article 313 of the BGB.5 1
Thus, following a catastrophic event, the Germans looked to the
notion of rebus sic stantibus to counteract the effects of its pacta
sunt servanda-basedlaw.
France also felt the effects of World War I and leaned on its
courts to find a solution to the problems that arose. Due to an
eighty percent devaluation in the franc and a drastic increase in the
price of coal, the French courts created the thgorie de l'imprvision
(theory of unexpected circumstances), which also allows for
judicial revision of a contract. 52 The courts limited the thorie de
l'imprdvision's scope to public law. Nevertheless, the need to find
equitable solutions for unfair laws was apparent. 53 Thus, France,
like Germany, faced a catastrophic event and sought relief from
54
pacta sunt servanda through application of rebus sic stantibus.
Although not at war, Louisiana is presently in the wake of its
own catastrophic event. The 2005 hurricane season left much of
South Louisiana devastated, causing both economic and emotional
ripples throughout the country. The catastrophes of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita affected obligors throughout the state, destroying
the basic assumptions on which they agreed to contract. The effect
is that performance under the contractual terms has become
excessively onerous.
For instance, what is a contractor to do who had his bid for a
construction job accepted shortly before the danger of the
50. Id. at 20; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 13, at 581-82; GERHARD
DANNEMANN, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW

31-32 (British Inst. of Int'l and Comp. Law 1993).
51. BGB § 313 (F.R.G.); Reinhard Zimmermann, Breach of Contract and
Remedies Under the New German Law of Obligations, 48 CTR. COMP. &
FOREIGN L. STUD. 1, 13 (2002), available at http://w3.uniromal.it/idc/centro/
publications/48zimmermann.pdf. Germany has an interesting approach to
changed circumstances under its civil law. The Germans separated physical
hardship (impracticability) from economic hardship. Id. at 12. Under the
former they only allow refusal of performance, whereas under the latter they
allow judicial modification. Id.
52. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 15; LITVINOFF, supra note 32, at 561-64;
Baudouin, supra note 42, at 154-55.
53. LITVINOFF, supra note 32, at 562.
54. Id,
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hurricanes materialized? In the hurricanes' wake, it may have
been extremely difficult to find skilled employees. In addition, the
lack of transportation and communication may have made it
onerous to get materials to the job site. These problems result in
the contractor not being able to perform at the price contained in
his bid, yet he is still bound to perform. Louisiana's impossibility
excuse does not apply because his performance is not absolutely
impossible. He can import in workers and materials from other
states and still perform. The fact that the cost may be exorbitant
makes no difference.
This is just one of many situations that may have occurred in
the wake of the 2005 hurricanes, and it is in these situations where
Louisiana law falls short. It is no surprise that many of the other
jurisdictions that now recognize a broader basis of excuse were
prompted to do so in similar circumstances. Therefore, looking
back at its own disaster, Louisiana must take a second look at55the
interplay between pactasunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus.
B. Legal Isolation
As the world becomes a more global economy, having laws
that are easier to align with other legal systems becomes
increasingly important. This movement is best evinced by the use
of international conventions, treaties, uniform codes, and
restatements to provide a written snapshot of the lex mercatoria
(law of the merchant), making it easier to complete business
agreements between different legal systems. 56 This idea is not new
55. This would not be the first time that Louisiana has been forced to
evaluate its stance on impossibility. During the gas price fluctuations in the
1980s, attorneys attempted to introduce the French imprrvision and the common
law commercial impracticability doctrines into Louisiana because of the adverse
effects of "take or pay" clauses; the courts denied it. See Hannover Petroleum
Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988). The
difference in the current situation is that many more obligors have been affected.
In addition, many of the contracts that have become excessively onerous may
have been entered into by laymen and not merchants.
56. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX
MERCATORIA 3-4, 144 (2d ed. 1999) (revealing that Unidroit's main goal. in
creating its principles was to "harmonize[] and coordinate[] the private law of
states and groups of states and to prepare for the progressive application of
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to Louisiana; on numerous occasions the legislature has adopted
laws from other bodies of law, including both the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).57
Having laws that are incompatible with those of other
jurisdictions has an even larger impact on Louisiana because of its
geographic position. Not only must Louisiana contend with
conflicting international laws, but it is also boxed in by, yet
inextricably tied to the legal systems of its sister states. 58 Because
Louisiana is the proverbial "odd man out," it is only further
alienating itself from the legal systems with which it shares the
largest commercial interest.
Thus, expanding Louisiana's strict

uniform private law"); see also Flambouras, supra note 26, at 262-63 (asserting
that implementing the CISG provided a "uniform sales law for countries that
account[s] for two-thirds of all world trade") (alteration in original); Guido
Alpa, The "Principlesof European ContractLaw" and the Italian Civil Code:
Some PreliminaryRemarks, 15 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 81, 81 (2001) (arguing
that the drafting of the PECL is a step forward along with the drafting of a
European Civil Code).
57. Trahan, supra note 27, at 1019, 1059-60 & nn.99-100. Compare LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2601 (2006), with United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods art. 19, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No.
98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; U.C.C. §§ 2-206-207 (2004). The comments to article
2601 state that it changes the law, but they fail to provide a reference to the
article's source. However, upon comparing article 2601 with article 19 of the
CISG and articles 2-206 and 2-207 of the U.C.C., the sources should become
fairly obvious. It should be noted that even though Louisiana used the CISG as
a source for one of its code articles, the CISG is a treaty and is already the law in
Louisiana when dealing with another country that has adopted the convention.
Once again, these are just illustrative examples and should not be construed as
an exhaustive list of laws from other jurisdictions enacted in Louisiana.
58. This author is in no way advocating that Louisiana should adopt a
common law principle. On the other hand, when the civil law supports a
doctrine that is also accepted by the common law, fewer difficulties arise in
interactions between the two legal systems.
59. See World Trade Center of New Orleans, Louisiana International Trade
Statistics, http://www.wtcno.org/tradestats/index.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2007) (showing that Louisiana exports more to other states than it does to
foreign jurisdictions) [hereinafter Trade Stats]; see also Louisiana Economic
Development & World Trade Center of New Orleans, 2005 Louisiana Export
Statistics Report, http://www.wtcno.org/publications/la-exp-report05.pdf (listing
Louisiana's top exports to foreign countries). Note that eight out of ten of
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view on impossibility will remove one more obstacle to attracting
trade and investment in the state.
C. Economic Inefficiency
Louisiana's current rules on impossibility are not the most
economically efficient option available. As deftly stated by
Professor Paul Joskow, "[A] strict interpretation of the rule of
discharge ... would only create an incentive ... to write a more
detailed and complicated contract," which would create "additional
negotiation costs." 60 By requiring absolute impossibility before an
obligor is excused for non-performance, Louisiana places a strict
requirement on its excuse from liability. Thus, while perhaps easy
for the judiciary to apply, Louisiana's current impossibility rules
only increase the transactional costs of the parties.
It bears noting, however, that the other extreme is just as
problematic. Transaction costs are also increased if the law is too
lenient in sheltering an obligor from his liability for nonaspect of
performance. 61 This is because the "risk-diversifying"
62
contracts would, in effect, become moot.
Risk diversification requires a little more explanation.
Working from the basic understanding that risk is "[t]he
uncertainty of a result, happening, or loss,, 63 contracts function to
distribute that risk between the contracting parties. If a legal
system provides a harsh, bright-line rule that assigns almost all risk
to a certain party, then those parties will have to spend money

Louisiana's top foreign exporting countries in addition to the United States have
adopted the CISG. Trade Stats, supra. Therefore it could be argued that the
laws of these jurisdictions have already been harmonized. This is not the case.
The CISG only deals with impossibility; it makes no mention of hardship or
changed circumstances. It has been argued that this creates a gap that should be
filled with either the Unidroit Principles, which would harmonize the law, or
domestic law through stipulated clauses, which would not harmonize the legal
systems. Flambouras, supra note 26, at 279-81.
60. Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 154 (1977).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (8th ed. 2004).
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inserting additional provisions to allocate risks in a different
manner. This is what Professor Joskow is talking about when
he
64
mentions the problems of an overly strict law of discharge.
In contrast, if a legal system provides an overly lenient rule of
discharge, parties have to make the same overcorrection; namely,
writing in more detailed provisions in order to ensure a certain
allocation of risk.65 Once again, transactional costs are increased
because of the added expense of these provisions. In addition, an
overly lenient rule of discharge may discourage certain parties
from entering into contracts at all,66negating this very important
risk-diversifying aspect of contracts.
In order to provide a more efficient rule of law to its citizens, it
is necessary for Louisiana to move away from its strict notion of
impossibility. However, it is also important not to overcompensate
by establishing an overly lenient basis for excusing nonperformance; to do so would only create the same transaction costs
already present in the current regime. As will be shown, through a
controlled application of rebus sic stantibus, a happy medium
between these two extremes can be implemented.
IV. WHY MUST THE CHANGE BE EMPLOYED THROUGH
LEGISLATION?

Besides invoking the legislature, perhaps the easiest method
would be to allow the courts to expand Louisiana's impossibility
excuse through jurisprudence. Unfortunately, that method has
already been attempted, and the courts have refused to move away
from pacta sunt servanda. The following section explores what
has been attempted in the past to blunt the edge of Louisiana's
view on impossibility, as well as how the courts have emasculated
those efforts by failing to take a very basic step in civilian
methodology: reading the Code.
Although the courts have failed to explore the idea, it is
arguable that Louisiana law is currently able to recognize a broader
excuse for non-performance based solely on the 1985 revision of
64. Joskow, supra note 60, at 154.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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the law of obligations. Professor Sdiul Litvinoff drafted the revised
articles on obligations that went into effect as part of the ongoing
revision of the Civil Code. In his revision, Professor Litvinoff did
two things that could have impacted Louisiana's adherence to a
strict impossibility excuse.
First, he moved the excuse of
impossibility of performance to its own section in the Code and
used the term "fortuitous event" while leaving out the term
"irresistible force." 67 Second, he added Louisiana Civil Code
68
article 1759 (good faith) under the general rules of obligations.
In making these changes, Professor Litvinoff implied on more than
one occasion that he formulated the code articles so as to give
Louisiana courts the 69 necessary tools to broaden Louisiana's
impossibility doctrine.
In applying these revised code articles, courts have not taken
advantage of the tools Professor Litvinoff provided. The Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal denied considering a commercial
impracticability argument, stating that Louisiana does not
recognize the doctrine. 70 Oddly enough, in support of its position,
the court did not cite the revised code articles on impossibility.
Instead, it cited jurisprudence that applied the law predating the
revision of the obligations. 7 1 The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
also held that a fortuitous event that made performance more
burdensome, but not impossible, does not excuse nonperformance. 72 The court, in the same manner as the second
67.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1873-78 (2007).

68. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (2007).
69. See Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 58-59; see also LITVINOFF, supra note
32, at 577.
70. Martin Forest Products v. Grantadams, 616 So. 2d 251, 254-55 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1993). In Martin Forest,the plaintiff, who ran a wood chip mill,
entered into a settlement with home owners dealing with noise restrictions. Id.
at 253. The court held that it did not matter that he had spent more than he
anticipated because commercial impracticability was not grounds for relief in
Louisiana. Id.at 254-55. Although argued as commercial impracticability, the
French doctrine of imprevision is similar in application.
71. Id. at 254 (citing Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 521 So. 2d
1234, 1240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988)).
72. West v. Cent. La. Limousine Serv., Inc., 856 So. 2d 203, 205 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2003). In West, a limousine company was unable to perform services on
the defendants wedding day because of mechanical problems. Id. at 204-05.
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circuit, cited prior jurisprudence and failed to discuss the revised
articles.73
Although Professor Litvinoff insinuated that the courts could
expand impossibility with his code articles, these decisions are
arguably still correct in their application. Regardless of Professor
Litvinoff's implications, the comments to most of the impossibility4
articles state that the new articles do not change the law.'
Therefore, citations to prior case law instead of the current
impossibility articles, although odd in a civil75law jurisdiction, may
not have really affected the courts' decisions.
Nevertheless, the court's application may have been affected
by the failure to make any reference to good faith under article
1759. When article 1759 was added, it expanded the notion of
good faith to obligations in general (versus its prior application
under only contractual performance).76 This is almost identical to
the German approach, which puts forth a more expanded notion of
good faith when compared to the traditional view. 77 In writing

The court stated that CLLS had a duty to secure the defendant another suitable
vehicle. Id. at 206. It should be noted that this author does not disagree with the
holding of this case. What is troublesome is the court's statement that it is
settled law that a more burdensome performance is not grounds for excuse. See
id. at 205. However, upon making that statement the court references old
jurisprudence and not the new code articles. Id. All the court had to say was
that since there was not fortuitous event, it did not have to address the question
of impracticability.
73. Id. (citing Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. v. Creston Hoop Co.,
109 So. 844, 844 (La. 1926); Schneck v. Capri Const. Co., 194 So. 2d 378 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967)).
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1873 cmt. a (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1874 cmt. a (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1875 cmt. a (2007); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 1876 cmt. a (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1878 cmt. a (2007).
75. It bears noting, however, that regardless of what the comments say, they
are not the law. Succession of Gonzales, 868 So. 2d 987, 990 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2004). Therefore, when they are in conflict with the Code articles, the articles
prevail.
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 cmt. (2007). Safil Litvinoff, Good Faith,
71 TUL. L. REv. 1645, 1646, 1659 (1997).
77.

See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 236-37 (2d ed.,

Blackstone Press Ltd. 1996) (1993), in which section 157 applies good faith to
the interpretation of agreements and section 242, combined with sections 133
and 157, applies good faith to obligations in general.
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about the role of this new article, Professor Litvinoff stated that
good faith has been "liberated from its confinement within the law
of performance of contracts and prompted

contractual stages.,

78

.

.

.

upon other

In particular, the professor sees good faith as

"the root of the solution .

. .

to the problem of supervening

excessive onerousness of performance caused by a change in
circumstances." 79 Thus, it seems likely that article 1759 was
intentionally introduced in the Code to provide courts with a way
without having to introduce
to expand the excuse of impossibility
8
new articles into the Code. 0
Unfortunately, courts have not taken the opportunity provided
to them. As the above-mentioned cases show, Louisiana courts
have adamantly adhered to the strict view of impossibility
inherited from France. Therefore, in order to invoke the more
equitable notion of rebus sic stantibus, Louisiana's current articles
on impossibility are inadequate, and it is necessary to look to an
alternative solution. It is necessary to act through the legislature to
effect a change in this area of the law.
V. THE PROJET

"Justice [is] a certain rectitude of mind, whereby a man does
what he ought ....,,8

After reviewing why Louisiana's current excuse of
impossibility is inadequate, and why legislative action is needed to
find equity, the next inquiry becomes, "What should the legislature
do?" Fortunately, Louisiana has the ability to walk in the long
shadow of legal development cast by numerous other jurisdictions
and organizations. Other legal systems have faced the same
problems now present in Louisiana and have created their own
Taking full account of these systems' proposed
solutions.
solutions, I offer a set of proposed articles that will expand
78. Litvinoff, supra note 76, at 1658.
79. Id. at 1661-62.
80. Professor Litvinoff has confirmed his intent for article 1759. Interview

with SaW1 Litvinoff, Boyd Professor of Law and Oliver P. Stockwell Professor,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 17, 2006) (on file with
author).
81.

1 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. 1 of2d pt., Q. 61, art. 4, at 848.
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Louisiana's current excuse of non-performance under contractual
obligations. These articles are written so as to be placed in
Chapter Eight of Title IV under "Conventional Obligations."
A. ProposedArticles
Section 6-SubstantialChange of Circumstance
Article (a)
Subject to the following modifications, an obligor is still bound
to perform a contractual obligation, even though performance
of that obligation has become more burdensome than that
obligor, at the time of contracting, had expected that
performance would be.
Article (b)
When an obligor's performance under a contractual obligation
has become more burdensome, or the performance received by
an obligee has become less valuable, because of a substantial
change of circumstances, the disadvantaged party may
unilaterally request renegotiation of the contract.
Negotiations must take place within a reasonable time
according to the circumstances.
A request for renegotiation does not entitle a disadvantaged
party to withhold performance. Performance may be withheld
only if allowed by the court.
Article (c)
A substantial change of circumstances occurs where a
fortuitous event causes a fundamental alteration of either the
obligor's or obligee's equilibrium, such that had the
circumstances been present at the time the contract was formed
either the obligor or obligee would not have consented to the
agreement.
Article (d)
A fortuitous event is one that at the time the contract was made
could not be reasonably foreseen.
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Article (e)
A fundamental alteration of equilibrium occurs in the following
situations: The value of the performance received from another
obligor has disproportionately decreased, or The cost of one
obligor's performance has disproportionately increased.
Where performance is capable of a precise measurement, a
change by more than half in the value or cost of performance
from the time the contract was made will be presumed
disproportionate.
Article (f
All parties shall be governed by the duty of good faith in both
the request for and the execution of renegotiations.
Article (g)
Upon failure to reach an agreement within a reasonable time,
either party may resort to the court.
Article (h)
If the court finds that a substantial change of circumstance has
occurred, it may leave the contract unmodified, dissolve the
contract in whole or in part, or modify the contract to restore
the parties' equilibrium.
Article (i)
The court shall dissolve the contract only when: taking into
account all of the surrounding circumstances and the principle
of good faith, adaptation to restore the parties' equilibrium is
impossible; or the obligor, obligee, or both refuse to continue
with the contract once it has been modified;
The court shall not dissolve the contract when: both parties
intend that the contract be preserved.
Article

6)

When dissolution of the contract is not required, the court may
modify the contract in any manner necessary to restore the
parties' equilibrium. Such modification may include but is not
limited to: postponing the term for performance; allowing the
obligor to make payments in installments when the object of an
obligor's performance is the payment of money; increasing or
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decreasing the required performance of the obligor; or
extending or shortening the term of the obligation.
Article (k)
The preceding articles do not apply when: the disadvantaged
obligor assumed the risk of the fortuitous event; the obligor had
been put into default before the fortuitous event occurred; or
the fortuitous event was preceded by the obligor's fault,
without which the substantial change of circumstances would
not have occurred.
82

B. Explanationand Application
1. Article (a)

Subject to the following modifications, an obligor is still
bound to perform a contractual obligation even though
performance of that obligation has become more
burdensome than that obligor, at the time of contracting,
had expected that performance would be.
Article (a) states the general rule of pacta sunt servanda. That
is to say that the parties are bound to perform their contractual
obligations regardless of any subsequent onerousness of
performance. The statement of this general rule is necessary
because Louisiana contract law is based on this notion. In
addition, the articles that follow will provide the only exception,
save impossibility, allowed. This article is specifically worded so
as not to effect the application of Louisiana's current articles on
impossibility. Thus, the general rule is that a party is bound to
perform when a contract has become more onerous; however, that
party is not bound to perform when performance becomes
83
impossible.
The sources of this article are both the Unidroit Principles and
the PECL. Both of these compilations begin their articles on
hardship (here called substantial change of circumstances) with the

82. All of the existing foreign code articles, uniform code articles, and
restatement articles mentioned in this section are reprinted infra appendix.
83. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1873 (2007).
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same pacta sunt servanda-based general rule. 84 The wording of
article (a), however, more closely follows the PECL approach
taken in article 6.111. This is because the general rule that the
obligation must be performed covers not only circumstances where
the obligor's performance becomes onerous, but also where the
performance received by the obligee decreases in value. 85 The
Unidroit principles, as written in article 6.2.1, only cover the
former situation. Therefore, even though the general rule stated in
article (a) is broader in application, similar to the PECL, it
embodies the same idea that is covered by both compilations of
principles.
Article (a)'s use of this general principle distinguishes it from
the approaches taken in other jurisdictions. Although reaching the
same result, the German and Italian codes, the American U.C.C.,
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts do not expressly
provide for a general rule in their articles. The articles in these
jurisdictions only mention the situations in which performance will
86
be excused, thus merely implying that a general rule is in force.
This same "exclusion only" approach can be found in other civil
87
law jurisdictions such as Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Therefore, while the approach taken in article (a) expressly
provides for a general rule, other jurisdictions reach the same rule
through deduction. Although worded differently, article (a) has the
same substantive basis as all of the codes and common law
compilations mentioned.
The first words contained in article (a) are: "Subject to the
following modifications." This word usage sets the stage for an
84. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.1; PECL, supra note 43,
art. 6.111; Flambouras, supra note 26, at 286; F. Macario, Interaction Between
the PECL and Italian Law, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND

ITALIAN LAW: A COMMENTARY 310, 310 (Luisa Antoniolli & Anna Veneziano
eds., 2005).
85. PECL, art. 6.111 ("A party is bound to fulfill its obligations even if
performance has become more onerous, whether because the costs of
performance has increased or because the value of the performance it receives
has diminished.") (emphasis added).
86. BGB § 275
2-3, § 313
1-2 (F.R.G.); C.C. art. 1467 (Italy);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265, 272 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-

615 (2004).
87. See GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409 (Turkm.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
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exception to article (a)'s general pacta sunt servanda rule.
Nevertheless, article (a), although allowing for an exception, at the
same time limits the scope of that exception to the articles that
immediately follow the general rule.
2. Article (b)
When an obligor's performance under a contractual
obligation has become more burdensome, or the
performance received by an obligee has become less
valuable, because of a substantial change of circumstances,
the disadvantaged party may unilaterally request
renegotiation of the contract.
Negotiations must take place within a reasonable time
according to the circumstances.
A request for renegotiation does not entitle a disadvantaged
party to withhold performance. Performance may be
withheld only if allowed by the court.
In its first paragraph, article (b) provides the exception alluded
to in article (a). That exception is recognized only where a
substantial change of circumstances has either increased the burden
of performance on the obligor, or decreased the value of the
performance received by the obligee. When this happens, the
affected party has the right to unilaterally request renegotiation of
the contract; however, that party does not unilaterally have the
right to withhold performance.
The sources of the first paragraph are once again both the
Unidroit Principles and the PECL. However, in contrast to article
(a), article (b) follows the method advocated in the Unidroit
Principles. Unidroit, and the proposed article (b), allow the party
who has been disadvantaged to request renegotiation of the
contract, but expressly prohibit refusing to perform.88 The PECL,
on the other hand, binds both parties with the obligation of entering
into renegotiations when performance has become more onerous,
89
yet makes no mention of a prohibition on refusing performance.
88.

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.3.

89. PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111. Although refusing performance is not
expressly forbidden, by forcing upon the parties a duty to renegotiate, it is
implied that the disadvantaged party does not have the right to refuse
performance and seek dissolution. Macario, supra note 84, at 311.
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Therefore, under the PECL, either party to a contract could force
renegotiation, even if they have not been adversely affected.
Article (b) purposefully follows Unidroit.
Allowing the affected party to refuse performance also garners
support from other civil codes. Article 383 of the Uzbekistan Civil
Code is written in such a way that it can be inferred that a party
cannot refuse to perform but must seek renegotiation with the other
party, or if that fails, petition the court. 90 Russian Civil Code
article 451 is drafted in a similar manner, thereby forcing the
parties to renegotiate before the contract may be rescinded. 9 ' This
wording in the Uzbekistan and Russian codes also gives rise to an
inference that onerousness alone does not give the right to refuse
performance-there needs to be onerousness in
conjunction with
92
both parties' inability to come to an agreement.
In allowing a right to force renegotiation but banning a refusal
to perform, article (b)'s application differs from certain other
jurisdictions that recognize a rebus sic stantibus-based excuse.
Pursuant to BGB sections 275, 313, and 314, German law allows a
disadvantaged party to refuse performance, petition the court for
alteration of the contract, or terminate the agreement. No mention
is made of renegotiation. 93 Therefore, forcing renegotiations on
the other party is not allowed. The Italian Civil Code takes a
different approach in that it allows a disadvantaged party to seek
dissolution of the contract; however, it does not create a right to
either request renegotiation or refuse performance. 94 The U.C.C.
allows a seller to refuse performance (or delay that performance)
when it becomes impracticable, but does not require
renegotiation. 95 Also, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
allows for dissolution and refusal to perform pursuant to
90. RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
91. GKart. 451 (Russ.).
92. GK art. 451 (Russ.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
93. BGB § 275 2-3, § 313
1-3, § 314 1 (F.R.G.).
94. C.C. art. 1467 (Italy). Nevertheless, the idea of renegotiation is not
unknown in Italian law. A more specific rule dealing with hardship in
construction contracts allows a request for price revision, when there has been
an increase or decrease in cost that is more than one-tenth of the total price
agreed upon. C.c. art. 1664.

95. U.C.C. § 2-615 (2004).
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impracticability and frustration of purpose, but it does not require
renegotiation. 96
Article (b), however, does not impose an absolute ban on
refusing to perform. The last provision in the article allows a
disadvantaged party (whether they are an obligor or obligee) to
withhold performance if allowed by the court. The purpose of this
article is found in the general pacta sunt servanda rule embodied
in article (a). All contracts should be upheld. As a result, an
obligor must perform and may not unilaterally walk away from a
contract. However, this provision allows the court to step in and
evaluate both the obligor's and obligee's relative positions. A
party may only withhold performance for which he is bound when
the court finds it reasonable. Presumably, the court would allow a
party to withhold performance by granting an injunction barring
the obligee from97requesting performance until after negotiations
have taken place.
In addition to ensuring contractual performance, article (b) also
imposes a reasonableness requirement on the timeframe in which
the renegotiation must take place. The purpose behind this
requirement is the need to address different situations individually.
Under some situations, it may be necessary for the parties to begin
negotiations within a short period of time following the request,
such as when an obligor is required to supply a certain amount of
perishable goods at a certain price in two days and a fortuitous
event causes a large increase in that obligor's cost of performance.
If the increase is such that fulfilling the obligation would put the
obligor out of business, the obligor faces the choice of performing
the obligation and going out of business, or breaching the contract
and being liable for damages in addition to losing the product.
Other situations, however, may not require such a quick initiation
of negotiations-where an obligor is bound to provide a certain
amount of goods for a certain price and performance is due in sixty
days. In this case, the parties have more time with which to work,
and the disadvantaged party may not be able to require the other
96. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265, 272 (1981).
97. There may be an added benefit to allowing a party to refuse
performance when it is reasonable; it will motivate the other party to work
toward a speedy resolution of the issue.
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party to enter negotiations as quickly. Overall, the reasonableness
requirement is included to ensure practical considerations are taken
into account when acting pursuant to these articles.
The reasonableness requirement in article (b) does not have a
counterpart in the PECL, but a similar provision is found in the
Unidroit Principles. Article 6.2.3 of the principles states that "the
98
request [for renegotiation] shall be made without undue delay."
If the party waits too long, it will lose the right to renegotiate and
find itself without a remedy.
Another underlying foundation of this provision is the good
faith requirement found in article (f), as well as the general good
faith rules embodied in Louisiana Civil Code articles 1759 and
1983. 99 Thus, refusing to enter negotiations within a reasonable
timeframe under the circumstances will breach the duty of good
faith, thereby making that party liable for all direct damages
pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 1997.100
3. Article (c)
A substantial change of circumstances occurs where a
fortuitous event causes a fundamental alteration of either
the obligor's or obligee's equilibrium, such that had the
circumstances been present at the time the contract was
formed, either the obligor or obligee would not have
consented to the agreement.
Article (c) supplements article (b) by providing the definition
of "substantial change of circumstances." The foundations of this
article are taken from a portion of the "hardship" definition found
in the Unidroit principles article 6.2.2., and the change of
circumstance definitions found in the German, Russian,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan Civil Codes.' 0 '
98.

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.3.

99. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1759, 1983 (2007).
100. Louisiana Civil Code article 1997 provides that: "an obligor in bad faith
is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of
his failure to perform."
1
101. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.2; BGB § 313
(F.R.G.); GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409 (Turkm.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
Pursuant to Unidroit, hardship is: "where the occurrence of events
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a
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The Unidroit-like wording was used in the first portion of the
definition, because it defines hardship from the perspective of both
the obligor and the obligee. The Restatement also takes this
bilateral approach, yet its common law language does not fit well
in these proposed articles. 10 2 Under the proposed articles, a
"substantial change of circumstances" can occur even if the party
can perform with no problem, but the counter-performance
received would be of little or no value. This inevitably ties
substantial change of circumstances to failure of cause.
The contributions of the German, Russian, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan codes come in the retroactivity of the analysis.
Article (b) follows those legal systems' approach by requiring
hindsight to the time the contract was formed to see if a substantial
change of circumstances has occurred. 10 3 Under article (c), even if
the party's equilibrium in the contract has been shattered, there is
no remedy if they would have still entered into the agreement.
In contrast, the other legal systems and compilations approach
the issue only from the perspective of the obligor. The PECL
defines "hardship" only in terms of performance becoming
excessively onerous-allowing an excuse only where the obligor is
concerned. 10 4 The Italian Civil Code does not actually use the
terms "hardship" or "substantial change of circumstances."
However, the Italian code takes the "obligor only" approach in

party's performance has increased or because the value of the performance a
party receives has diminished." UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.2.
The Turkmenistan code requires a change of circumstances to effect the terms in
such a way that "the parties would not have concluded it or would have
concluded it with other content." TCC art. 409. The Uzbekistan code finds a
material change of circumstances when "the contract would not have been
concluded at all by them or it would have been concluded on significantly
differing conditions." RUCC art. 383. Finally, the Russian Civil Code provides
that a change of circumstances is significant when "they have changed so much
that, if the parties could have reasonably foreseen them, the contract would not
have been concluded by them, or would have been concluded on significantly
different conditions." GK art. 451 (Russ.).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
103. See BGB § 313
1 (F.R.G.); GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409
(Turkm.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
104. PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111.
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"events make
allowing a request for dissolution ' when
0 5
onerous."
excessively
performance...
Although article (c) provides the general definition of
"substantial change of circumstances," it also provides two more
terms that must be defined before the group of articles can be
applied. These terms are "fortuitous event" and "fundamental
alteration," which are defined in articles (d) and (e) respectively.
4. Article (d)
A fortuitous event is one that at the time the contract was
made could not be reasonably foreseen.
This definition is identical to the one found in Louisiana Civil
Code article 1875. Having the same definition for the same word
occur twice in the Code is intentional. The Louisiana Legislature
has a tendency of giving the same word different meanings
throughout the Code. For instance, when assessing whether a
possessor is entitled to ten or thirty year acquisitive prescription,
good faith is defined in Louisiana Civil Code article 3480 as
"reasonably believ[ing], in light of objective considerations, that
[you] [are] owner of the thing [you] possess[].' 1 6 Article 3480
provides an objective definition of good faith. In contrast, good
faith has been given an entirely different meaning when dealing
with accession issues. Louisiana Civil Code article 487 defines
good faith for purposes of accession as "possess[ing] by virtue of
an act translative of ownership and . . . not know[ing] of any
defects in . ..ownership."'10 7 Thus, for purposes of accession,
good faith contains a subjective element. Therefore, the repetitive
definitions of fortuitous event are necessary to provide consistency
in the Code.
Unforeseeability is not a requirement that is unique to either
the Louisiana Civil Code or these proposed articles. With the
exception of Turkmenistan's code, all of the civil codes mentioned
08
in this Comment contain express unforeseeability requirements.1
105. C.c. art. 1467 (Italy).
106. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3480 (2007).
107. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 487 (2007).
1 (F.R.G.); C.c. art. 1467 (Italy); GK art. 451 (Russ.);
108. BGB § 313
RUCC 383 (Uzb.).
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Furthermore, Unidroit and the PECL also require that the
possibility of the change
of circumstances could not have been
09
1
account.
into
taken
5. Article (e)
A fundamental alteration of equilibrium occurs in the
following situations: The value of the performance received
from another obligor has disproportionately decreased, or the
cost of one obligor's performance has disproportionately
increased.
Where performance is capable of a precise measurement, a
change by more than half in the value or cost of performance
from the time the contract was made will be presumed
disproportionate.
Article (e) provides both a definition of a "fundamental
alteration of equilibrium," as well as an example. The definition
takes the same bilateral approach used when defining a
"substantial change of circumstances." In other words, it addresses
the issue from both the obligor's and obligee's perspective. In
effect, a fundamental alteration of equilibrium occurs where either
the cost or value of performance has disproportionately changed
from the time the contract was perfected.
The source of this definition leans more heavily on the wording
contained in Unidroit and the PECL; however, this idea is
embodied, to various extents, in all of the codes and compilations
that have previously been discussed. 10 The German, Russian,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan codes contain this notion in their
definition of changed circumstances."' 1 These codes look to
whether the parties would not have entered into the agreement if
109. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.2; PECL, supra note 43,
art. 6.111. Interestingly, the Russian code also requires that the change in
circumstances be caused by a force the parties could not have overcome. GK
art. 451. It may be of interest to the reader that Louisiana (and now the
proposed articles) has the same requirement. In Louisiana, the term fortuitous
event encompasses both of the terms cas fortuit (fortuitous event) and force
majeure (irresistible force). LA. CIv CODE ANN. art. 1873 cmt. c (2007).
110. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.2; PECL, supra note
43, art. 6.111.
111. See BGB § 313
1 (F.R.G.); GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409
(Turkm.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
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the changed circumstances would have been present from the
outset. If they would not have entered into the agreement, it is
implied that the reason is either that the cost or value of
performance would no longer be advantageous. The Italian Civil
Code covers performance that has become excessively onerous,
implying that the cost of performance has increased. Finally, the
U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts express this
idea when mentioning performance that has become
impracticable. 112
The presumption created in article (e) helps clarify how much
of a value or cost change is needed before that change will be
considered disproportionate. In essence, this article allows the
party who has been disadvantaged the benefit of a rebuttable
presumption, while at the same time giving the unaffected party
the ability to rebut that presumption if circumstances dictate.
This provision in article (e) does not have a corresponding
provision under any other code articles on changed circumstances
or hardship. The sources of this provision are, instead, found in
two places: (1) Louisiana Civil Code article 2589 dealing with
lesion; and11(2) an official comment to article 6.2.2 in the Unidroit
Principles.
Under lesion, a sale of an immovable may be rescinded if the
price is less than one half of the value, or beyond moiety. 114 The
same standard was incorporated into article (e) in an effort to both
maintain consistency in the Code and emphasize the high
requirement necessary for a fundamental alteration of equilibrium.
Although article (e)'s example is similar to one of Unidroit's
official comments, the application in the proposed article differs in
one aspect-Unidroit makes no reference to a rebuttable
presumption." 5 Instead, the comment states that a fifty percent
alteration in either cost or value of the performance "is likely to
amount to a fundamental' alteration.""6 Thus, the Unidroit
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981); U.C.C. § 2615 (2004).
113. LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art. 2589 (2007); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note
43, art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2.
114. Art. 2589.
115. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2.
116. Id.(emphasis added).
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comment only provides a general guideline for the court whereas
proposed article (e) creates a procedural shift in the burden of
proof.
6. Article 09
All parties shall be governed by the duty of good faith in
both the request for and the execution of renegotiations.
Article (f) provides, perhaps, the most fundamental addition to
the law. At first glance this article does not seem remarkable. The
plain wording simply seems to bind parties to act in good faith
when requesting and carrying out renegotiation of their contract.
However, the impact of this article goes far beyond its wording.
As mentioned earlier, Professor Litvinoff added article 1759
(good faith) during the most recent revision on the law of
obligations. Article 1759 expanded good faith in Louisiana to
cover everything pertaining to an obligation." 7 This inclusion
moved Louisiana away from French good faith and moved the
18
state closer to the position taken by Germany and Switzerland.
It is this author's position that inclusion of article 1759 was one of
the main tools the professor was speaking of when he stated:
[T]he express formulation of rules that before the revision
had to be surmised from general principles may have the
salutary effect of bringing about a recognition of the need
for more flexibility in the interpretation and application of
the basic rule that governs impossibility as an excuse for
nonperformance, so that reasonable exceptions can be made
that, without changing the rule will make it more
functionally responsive to the demands of the
9
contemporary business community."l
This is where article (f) begins to show its real importance.
Reading article (f) together with the other proposed articles, it
117. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (2007).
118. See Baudouin, supra note 42, at 156-57; see also Jean-Louis Baudouin,
Oppressive and Unequal Contracts: The Unconscionability Problem in
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1119, 1132 (1986)
[hereinafter Baudouin, Unequal].
119. LITVINOFF, supra note 32, at 577.
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becomes apparent that good faith has been expanded. Under the
wordings of articles (b) and (f), when a fortuitous event creates a
substantial change of circumstances, the party who has benefited
from the event now has a duty (upon request) to renegotiate the
contract. In essence, good faith is used to keep a contract alive by
forcing the parties to attempt to reach an agreement.
This article was not created out of thin air. It is based on the
foundations laid in Louisiana Civil Code article 1759.
Furthermore, as with other articles in this projet, the PECL
provides a basis for this article. PECL article 6.111 does differ,
however, from the approach taken in article (f). The PECL states
that "the court may award damages for the loss suffered through a
party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to
good faith and fair dealing." 120 Thus, the PECL article has a
negative application, since refusing to renegotiate will violate an
implied duty, whereas article (f) takes a positive approach in
expressly creating a duty to renegotiate. Nevertheless, both
articles should reach the same result.
7. Article (g)
Upon failure to reach an agreement within a reasonable
time, either party may resort to the court.
Article (g) is included to reinforce the idea that a party must
first attempt to renegotiate the contract before seeking a court
remedy. Judicial revision of a contract has traditionally not been
favored in Louisiana. 121 Therefore, the policy behind this article is
that the law prefers parties to come to an agreement.
This article also imposes a reasonableness requirement before a
party may seek judicial intervention. Reasonableness here also ties
into the good faith requirement stated in the previous article. Thus,
if a party has not attempted to negotiate for at least a reasonable
time under the circumstances, the duty of good faith is breached
and that party may become liable for direct damages. 122

120.

PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111.

121. An explanation of Louisiana's reluctance to give broad discretionary
powers to its courts will be discussed later in this Comment.
122.

See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 (2007).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

The source of this article is the Unidroit Principles. Unidroit
article 6.2.3 contains identical wording to article (g) in paragraph
three, under the general title Effects of [H]ardship.123 A similar
provision is also included in article 6.111 of the PECL; however,
its structure provides for a different analysis.' 24 Other codes that
call for renegotiation, such as the Russian, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan codes, take an approach similar to the PECL. There is
no express duty to renegotiate for a reasonable time contained in
these codes, but if an agreement cannot be reached, certain rights
are granted to the disadvantaged party. 125 The language of
Unidroit was used because it creates a positive duty as opposed to
a negative sanction.
8. Article (h)
If the court finds that a substantial change of circumstances
has occurred, it may leave the contract unmodified,
dissolve the contract in whole or in part, or modify the
contract to restore the parties' equilibrium.
Article (h) provides three actions that the court is allowed to
implement which may affect the parties' original contract.
However, before the court can take these actions: (1) either the
obligor or the obligee must have sought judicial intervention; (2)
the court must evaluate the circumstances and find that a
substantial change of circumstances has taken place; (3) a
substantial change of circumstances must have fundamentally
altered the parties' equilibrium; (4) the reasonable timeframe for
negotiation must be met; and (5) the party seeking the court's
action must have complied with all good faith requirements. Once
all five of these elements have been satisfied, the court has limited

123. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.3.
124. PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111. Article 6.111 does not specifically
state that parties must negotiate for a reasonable period; instead, it provides a set
of judicial remedies if the parties fail to reach an agreement within a reasonable
period. Id. Therefore, as both the PECL and Unidroit have a tendency to do,
they create duties through an indirect approach versus creating a positive duty.
125. See GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409 (Turkm.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.).
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discretion to26 either alter the original agreement or leave it
unchanged.1
This article is written with broad terminology with respect to
what the court can do to affect the original agreement. This is
because it is introductory and will be narrowed in scope by
subsequent articles. The court's outer boundary of power includes
the ability to modify the contract to restore the parties'
equilibrium, dissolve the contract in whole or in part, or simply
leave the contract untouched.
The sources of this article are harder to identify than the
preceding articles. Because each particular system uses its own
approach, which often includes at least one, but rarely all three, of
these powers, article (h) does not rely specifically on one system.
Instead, it is an aggregate of the remedies allowed
in all of the
127
previously discussed codes and compilations.
9. Article (i)
The court shall dissolve the contract only when: taking into
account all of the surrounding circumstance and the
principle of good faith, adaptation to restore the parties'
equilibrium is impossible; or the obligor, obligee, or both
refuse to continue with the contract once it has been
modified;
The court shall not dissolve the contract when: both parties
intend that the contract be preserved.
Article (i) narrows the discretion the court is allowed. It lays
down guidelines dictating when the court is required to dissolve a
contract and when it is precluded from doing so. The court is
prohibited from modifying a contract when it is not possible to
fairly distribute the unanticipated loss between the parties. In
making this determination, the court must look at the parties' duty
of good faith as well as the situation surrounding the change of
circumstances.
126. This limitation of the courts' discretion will be more apparent when the
next proposed article is analyzed.
127. See BGB § 313 (F.R.G.); GK art. 451 (Russ.); TCC art. 409 (Turkm.);
RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, art. 6.2.3; PECL,

supra note 43, art. 6.111.
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The court is also required to dissolve the contract when either
or both parties refuse to continue under the contract after the court
has modified its terms. The sources of these provisions in article
(i) are the restrictions placed on contract alteration in the law of
Switzerland, as well the idea that
the extinction of the obligation
28
should be used as a last resort.'
On the other hand, when both parties intend to continue under
the contract but are not able by themselves to reach an agreement,
article (i) prohibits the court from dissolving the contract. This
requirement again supports the idea that where possible, the
contract should be preserved. It also prevents the courts from
taking "the easy way out" by extinguishing the obligation versus
adapting it to the new situation.129 Requiring the court to modify a
contract if possible can also be supported by the positions taken in
Germany, Unidroit, and the PECL; however, it is in direct
conflict
30
1
Italy.
and
Uzbekistan,
Russia,
of
approaches
the
with
10.

Article 6)

When dissolution of the contract is not required, the court
may modify the contract in any manner necessary to restore
the parties' equilibrium. Such modification may include
but is not limited to: postponing the term for performance;
128. Theo Rauh, Capital Market: Legal Consequences of Force Majeure
Under German, Swiss, English and the United States' Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L.
&POL'Y 151, 154 (1996).

129. This author is fully aware of the idea that every contractual modification
includes a rescission of the original obligation. However, the idea here is not
that the parties have to continue being bound regardless of the circumstances;
instead, it is that the parties originally came to an agreement. Therefore when
the parties want to continue in that relationship, it is not the courts' role to
disturb that intent.
130. See BGB § 313
1, 3 (F.R.G.). Both Unidroit and the PECL articles
are written so that the court has a choice. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note
43, art. 6.2.3; PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111. When these articles are read
together with the general pacta sunt servanda principle they contain, it would
seem as though the court should attempt to modify the contract when possible.
Russia and Uzbekistan only allow the court to alter a contract in exceptional
circumstances; those countries prefer dissolution as a remedy. GK art. 451
(Russ.); RUCC art. 383 (Uzb.). Italy also only allows dissolution, yet makes an
exception in article 1664 dealing with supervening hardship for contractors.
C.C. arts. 1467, 1664 (Italy).
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allowing the obligor to make payments in installments
when the object of an obligor's performance is the payment
of money; increasing or decreasing the required
performance of the obligor; or extending or shortening the
term of the obligation.
Article (j) provides further guidance for the court by providing
examples of modifications the court may make to a contract. The
court may postpone the term for performance, such as allowing an
obligor to delay rendering his required performance without fear of
being placed in default. When the obligation is the payment of
money, an obligor may be allowed to render payments in
installments where a lump sum was originally required. For
example, suppose an obligor has contracted to buy a house by
paying a lump sum, but the stock market crashes, wiping out the
money that was to be used to pay the price. If feasible, the court
may allow the obligor to pay the price in installments. The court
may also increase or decrease the required performance, such as
raising the sale price to compensate for an unexpected rise in the
cost of production. Finally, the court may lengthen or shorten the
time the parties will be bound by a contract. For instance, where
economic conditions make it so that the obligor will be able to
perform at a profit for only a certain amount of time, the court may
shorten the term of the obligation to end when the obligor begins
showing a loss. As provided in article (j), these examples are
merely illustrative.
Article (j) also restates the equilibrium requirement contained
in article (h). This is included to provide consistency in the
articles. Following this requirement, the court may make any
changes necessary to restore the parties' equilibrium. Note,
however, that the article in no way implies that the court must alter
the contract to make it fair. The purpose of these articles as a
whole is to restore the parties to their original agreement, not to
save them from a bad bargain.
11. Article (k)
The preceding articles do not apply when: the
disadvantaged obligor assumed the risk of the fortuitous
event; the obligor had been put into default before the
fortuitous event occurred; or the fortuitous event was
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preceded by the obligor's fault, without which the
substantial change of circumstances would not have
occurred.
The final article in the projet provides for situations where the
preceding articles are excluded from application. The simple logic
behind this article is based on economic principles. For instance,
under the first exclusion provision, these articles have no
application when the event that caused the problem could be
foreseen because foresight extinguishes the fortuity of the event.
Since the articles in this projet require a fortuitous event in order to
be applicable, when the obligor assumes the risk that an event will
occur, the entire purpose of the articles collapses. Thus, the
obligor will not be able to find relief because he held the risk and
should bear the loss.
Also tied to the idea of risk is the second exclusion provision.
An obligor cannot benefit from these articles when in default.
Under Louisiana law, when an obligor is put into default, the
obligee's risk of loss is shifted to the obligor.' 3 1 In addition, the
obligor should not be allowed to benefit from his own delay in
performance. Had the obligor performed as required, the loss
would have been sustained by the obligee.
Note the difference between the approach taken here and that
taken under impossibility in Louisiana Civil Code article 1874. In
article 1874, being put in default will not exclude the obligor from
benefiting from the impossibility excuse if the object of
performance would have been destroyed in the hands of the
obligee. 132 This approach is based on the idea that the object
would have been destroyed regardless of who had possession. In
article (k), the excuse is based only on changed circumstances.
The obligor can still perform; it is just excessively burdensome.
Had the obligor performed as was required, the obligee would have
had to deal with the burden, and the obligor would face no
hardship. Thus, the obligor is not allowed to benefit from his own
non-performance.

131.
132.

LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1992 (2007).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1874 (2007).
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C. Economic Inefficiency Revisited
Rebus sic stantibus can provide an efficient happy medium for
lowering transaction costs. In analyzing "impracticability" in the
Uniform Commercial Code, Professor Paul Joskow found that
"[t]he key to... a rule of discharge working well is to provide an
appropriate and well understood list of occurrences and an
appropriate and well-defined standard for calculating what a
dramatic increase in cost is." ' 133 He found that section 2-615 of the
U.C.C. met this standard because it contained four elements: (1) a
foreseeability test; (2) an assumption of the risk test; (3) a defined34
standard of "impracticability;" and (4) a good faith requirement.
Because the proposed articles meet these elements, it 35
can be
presumed that they are also an efficient standard of excuse.'
The importance of the "forseeability test" is that it draws a line
between events that are "reasonably part of the decisionmaking
process and those that are not."' 36 This idea encompasses the
theory of "bounded rationality," which is the recognition that it is
not possible for humans to evaluate all possible contingencies of a
particular situation. 137 When parties contract, they include only a
133. Joskow, supra note 60, at 154. In addition, it should be noted that
Professor Joskow is not the only source for a standard of economic efficiency.
Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield have also provided a standard for
allocating risk between parties in situations they did not foresee. Their method,
labeled the "Superior Risk Bearer Model," allocates risk based on which party is
the more efficient risk bearer and could have better prevented or insured against
a particular risk. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and
Related Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.

83, 90 (1977). Scholars have criticized this approach as being unrealistic due to
the complexity of its application. See Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr,
Understanding Commercial Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with
Community Fairness Norms, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 354 (1996); Aaron J.

Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the
ImpracticabilityDoctrine, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 2183, 2195 (2005). Therefore,
this author feels that Professor Joskow provides a more workable model.
134. See Joskow, supra note 60, at 154-61.
135. This author is not saying that the proposed articles provide the most
efficient method for handling discharge, only that they are more efficient than
the current system.
136. Joskow, supra note 60, at 157.
137.

Id.
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small subset of possible contingencies in the agreement, thus,
courts can enforce a contract only 38to the extent of the
contingencies included in the agreement.'
The proposed articles create a foreseeability test by including
the civilian notion of fortuitous event. By its definition, a
fortuitous event is something that could not be reasonably
foreseen. 39 If the event that caused a substantial change of
circumstances is not fortuitous, it was within the foreseeability of
the parties and no remedy will be found under the proposed
articles. Thus, element one of Joskow's analysis is met.
The second element of Joskow's analysis is an assumption of
the risk test. It is basically "an extension of the foreseeability test"
and provides the court with a standard for evaluating the
circumstances surrounding the contract. 40 Therefore, if one of the
parties has implicitly assumed the risk of the fortuitous event, there
is no remedy found in the proposed articles.
Article (k) expressly supplies an assumption of the risk test. It
does so by stating that the entire regime of substantial change of
circumstances does not apply if the disadvantaged obligor assumed
the risk of the fortuitous event. Thus, element two of Joskow's
analysis is met.
The third element in Joskow's analysis is a defined standard of
impracticability. Joskow found that U.C.C. § 2-615 met this
requirement because it put high limitations on what would be
required in order to meet the impracticability definition. 14 1 In
further defining this standard, Joskow mentions that a tenfold
increase in price might be sufficient. 42 Thus, an increase in price
must be "marked"
or "extreme and unreasonable" before the
43
1
met.
is
standard
While at civil law, the terms "hardship" and "changed
circumstances" are used instead of impracticability, the notions are
the same. With this is mind, the defined standards of a substantial
change of circumstances are found in proposed articles (c) and (e).
138. Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1875 (2007).
140. This is what civilians might call an inconcreto analysis of the facts.
141. Joskow, supra note 60, at 159-60.
142. Id. at 160.
143. Id. at 159-60.
139.
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Pursuant to these articles, the fortuitous event must create a
fundamental alteration of equilibrium. This fundamental alteration
must produce such a disproportionate change in the parties
equilibrium that had it existed at the time of the agreement, they
would not have consented to the contract. Furthermore, this
standard is aided by a presumption when either the value or cost of
performance changes by more than one half.
It is obvious that a fifty percent change is much lower than the
ten-fold increase contemplated by Joskow. Nevertheless, it should
be sufficient to meet the requirement because under the proposed
articles, a fifty percent change only creates a presumption. If the
other party can show that such a change is normal, or at least not
disproportionate under the circumstances, then the disadvantaged
party will be bound to the contractual terms. Thus, the proposed
articles create a "defined standard," and the third element of
Joskow's analysis is met.
Finally, in order to meet all the elements under Joskow's
analysis, the proposed articles must contain a good faith
requirement. The professor evaluates this element as requiring that
the disadvantaged party: (1) take all reasonable steps to perform as
promised; and (2) be without fault. 144 Thus, in essence there must
be a requirement that the party seeking a remedy act in good faith.
Articles (f) and (k) embody this requirement in the proposed
articles. Article (f) requires that the parties shall be governed by
good faith in the request for renegotiations. Therefore, if the party
seeking a remedy has failed to do everything possible to perform
as originally agreed, that party will be denied a remedy. In
addition, article (k) expressly requires that the party be free from
any fault that would have prevented the substantial change of
circumstances from occurring. Thus, the fourth and final element
of Joskow's analysis is met.
In concluding the efficiency discussion, it warrants mentioning
that the proposed articles really make only one efficiency-related
change from the current impossibility law. They expand the overly
restrictive "absolute impossibility" requirement to allow an excuse
even when performance is possible. Parties can now contract
without being forced to anticipate every conceivable event through
144.

Id. at 161-63.
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force majeure clauses. Joskow stated that "[a] strict interpretation
of the rule of discharge which puts too much of the risk on the
[obligor]" creates "additional . . . costs.' 4 5 Thus, the proposed
articles are more efficient because they take the one flaw in the
current approach to impossibility and transform it into that "happy
medium."
VI. DEFENSE: LOUISIANA LAW SUPPORTS JUDICIAL MODIFICATION
OF CONTRACTS

The purpose of this Comment is not only to propose a new
basis for expanding excuse for non-performance in Louisiana, but
also to handle certain objections to implementation of the proposed
articles. The major "complaint" against implementation comes in
the argument that Louisiana law does not support judicial
modification of a contract. The following section will address this
issue.
The Louisiana Civil Code does not support judicial
modification of a contract. At first glance, this is a very reasonable
assertion. Louisiana Civil Code article 1983 provides that a
contract "[has] the effect of law for the parties."" 6 Thus, "[being
the] 'law' the parties had freely chosen to give themselves and
freely chosen to abide by... it [is] enforceable as such and [can]
not be changed, altered, or modified except with the consent of
[the] parties."' 147 Furthermore, it is arguable that "[b]eing an act of
free will . . . it [is] by definition just and fair in its results and
effects."' 148 This is the same approach used in article 11 of the
Code Napoldon, which was incorporated into Louisiana law
through article 34 of the Digest of 1808.149

145.

Id. at 154.

146. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2007).
147. Baudouin, Unequal,supra note 118, at 1120.
148. Id.
149. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901 (1947) (historical note). Interestingly,
Baudouin says that article 11 of the Code Napolon states the same proposition
as the current Louisiana Civil Code article 1983. Baudoin, Unequal,supra note
118, at 1120. The historical note to article 1901 of the Code of 1870 (which is
the predecessor to the current article 1983) states that article 1134 of the Code
Napoleon was the predecessor to the current article 1983.
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The harsh French view against judicial revision is thought to
have its source in the French Revolution, which created a suspicion
of judicial power. 50 Louisiana thereby followed its strict French
roots by consistently taking a hard stand against judicial revision of
contracts. 151 Thus, it would seem as though Louisiana has stayed
true to the ideas it received from France, precluding courts from
taking an active role in contract modification; however, this is not
the case.
The current Louisiana law does indeed support judicial
modification of a contract freely entered into between two
consenting parties. In instances such as partial impossibility,
stipulated damages, dissolution, and lease, the court is allowed
some leeway to modify the parties' agreement. 52 For instance,
pursuant to article 1877, when performance has become impossible
in part, the court may reduce the amount by which the parties are
bound. 53 When stipulated damages are "so manifestly
unreasonable as to be contrary to public policy," the court is
allowed to modif y the agreement by reducing the amount to a
reasonable sum.'
Also, when a party seeks judicial dissolution of
a contract, the court has the ability to refuse the request and alter
the agreement by providing the obligor with more time to
perform.' 55 Furthermore, when parties to a lease cannot agree on
the re-determination of rent, the court is allowed to unilaterally fix
the rent. 156 Thus, not only has Louisiana moved away from the
original French hostility toward contract modification, it has gone
so far as to legislatively endorse it under certain circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rebus sic stantibus and pacta sunt servanda have been
employed by numerous legal systems in various forms. Each
system has implemented these rules and provided various
150. Baudouin, Unequal,supra note 118, at 1123.
151. Id.
152. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at 59-60.
153. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1877 cmt. a (2007).
154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2011 (2007).
155. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2013 (2007).
156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2676 (2007).
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exclusions based on their contemporary needs. It is with this in
mind that Louisiana must evaluate where it stands. Law must
change with society; else, instead of promoting a structured system
for the interaction of free peoples, it becomes a tool for oppression
and inequity.
Throughout history, the law has seen an ebb and flow between
strict adherence and equity. Whether it is the abolishment of the
writ system in England, or the move away from code pleading in
federal civil procedure, the balance between these two driving
forces is not easy to find. However, the constant theme is the
ability of legal systems to adapt their laws to the needs of society.
In making its decision, Louisiana should listen to the lessons
that history has provided. Louisiana does not have the burden of
writing on a blank slate. Numerous other jurisdictions have
wrestled with this problem and attempted to resolve it by what was
believed to be in the best interest of the people. Using the past
accomplishments and mistakes of these other systems, Louisiana
has the opportunity to move its law forward, extricating itself from
the bounds of ideology long past. Hopefully, the opportunity will
not be squandered.
Charles Tabor*

* Co-recipient of the Association Henri Capitant, Louisiana Chapter
Award for best paper on a civil law topic or a comparative law topic with an
emphasis in the civil law.
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APPENDIX

A. Principlesof European ContractLaw
Article 6.111 (ex art. 2.11 7)-of Circumstances
(1) A party is bound to fulfil[l] its obligations even if
performance has become more onerous, whether because the cost
of performance has increased or because the value of the
performance it receives has diminished.
(2) If, however, performance of the contract becomes
excessively onerous because of a change of circumstances, the
parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to adapting
the contract or terminating it, provided that:
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time of
conclusion of the contract,
(b) the possibility of a change of circumstances was not
one which could reasonably have been taken into account
at the time of conclusion of the contract, and
(c) the risk of the change of circumstances is not one
which, according to the contract, the party affected should
be required to bear.
(3) If the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable
period, the court may:
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be
determined by the court; or
(b) adapt the contract in order to distribute between the
parties in a just and equitable manner the losses and gains
resulting from the change of circumstances.
In either case, the court may award damages for the loss
suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or57 breaking off
negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing.'

157.

PECL, supra note 43, art. 6.111.
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B. The UnidroitPrinciples
SECTION 2: HARDSHIP
ARTICLE 6.2.1 (Contractto be Observed)
Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous
for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform
its obligations subject to the following provisions on hardship.
ARTICLE 6.2.2 (Definitionof Hardship)
There is hardship where the occurrence of events
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract either because
the cost of a party's performance has increased or because the
value of the performance a party receives has diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged
party after the conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into
account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of
the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged
party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the
disadvantaged party.
ARTICLE 6.2.3 (Effects of Hardship)
(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to
request renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue
delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based.
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the
disadvantaged party to withhold performance.
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time
either party may resort to the court.
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed, or
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its
equilibrium. 58

158.

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES,

supra note 43, arts. 6.2.1-2.3.
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C. The German BGB
Section 1: Subject matter of obligations
Title 1: Obligationto perform
§ 275. Exclusion of the obligation to perform
(1) A claim for performance cannot be made in so far as it is
impossible for the obligor or for anyone else to perform.
(2) The obligor may refuse to perform in so far as performance
requires expenditure which, having regard to the subject matter of
the obligation and the principle of good faith, is manifestly
disproportionate to the obligee's interest in performance. When
determining what may reasonably be required of the obligor,
regard must also be had to whether he is responsible for the
impediment.
(3) Moreover, the obligor may refuse to perform if he is to
effect the performance in person and, after weighing up the
obligee's interest in performance and the impediment to
performance, performance cannot be reasonably required of the
obligor.
(4) The obligee's rights are determined by §§ 280, 283 to 285,
31 la and 326.
Sub-title 3: Adaptation and cessationof contracts
§ 313. Interference with the basis of the contract
(1) If circumstances upon which a contract was based have
materially changed after conclusion of the contract and if the
parties would not have concluded the contract or would have done
so upon different terms if they had foreseen that change, adaptation
of the contract may be claimed in so far as, having regard to all the
circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or
statutory allocation of risk, it cannot reasonably be expected that a
party should continue to be bound by the contract in its unaltered
form.
(2) If material assumptions that have become the basis of the
contract subsequently turn out to be incorrect, they are treated in
the same way as a change in circumstances.
(3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or cannot
reasonably be imposed on one party, the disadvantaged party may
In the case of a contract for the
terminate the contract.
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performance of a recurring obligation, the right to terminate is
replaced by the right to terminate on notice.
§ 314. Termination, or good cause, of contracts for the
performance of a recurringobligation
(1) Either party may terminate a contract for the performance
of a recurring obligation on notice with immediate effect if there is
good cause for doing so. There is good cause if, having regard to
all the circumstances of the specific case and balancing the
interests of both parties, the terminating party cannot reasonably be
expected to continue the contractual relationship until the agreed
termination date or until the end of a notice period.
(2) If the good cause consists in the infringement of a duty
under the contract, the contract may be terminated on notice only
after a specified period for remedial action has expired or notice of
default has been given to no avail. § 323 (2) applies mutatis
mutandis.
(3) The person entitled may terminate only if he gives notice of
termination within a reasonable period after becoming aware of the
cause for termination.
(4) The right to claim damages is not precluded by the
termination. 159
D. The Russian Civil Code
Chapter29 (Amendment and Rescission of a Contract)
Article 451
1. A significant change in the circumstances from which the
parties proceeded in concluding the contract shall constitute
grounds for its amendment or rescission, unless otherwise
specified by the contract or indicated by its nature.
A change in the circumstances shall be considered significant
when they have changes so much that, if the parties could have
reasonably foreseen them, the contract would not have been
concluded by them, or would have been concluded on significantly
different conditions.
2. If the parties have failed to reach agreement on bringing the
contract in conformance with the significantly changed
159.

BGB §§ 275,313-14 (F.R.G.).
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circumstances or on its rescission, the contract may be rescinded,
and on the grounds specified in paragraph 4 of the present
article--amended by a court at the petition of an interested party if
the following conditions are concurrently present:
1) at the time of concluding the contract, the parties acted
on the fact that such change in circumstances would not
occur;
2) the change in circumstances was caused by reasons
which the interested party could not overcome after their
emergence, using the same degree of care and caution
which was required of it under the nature of the contract
and the conditions of commerce;
3) performance of the contract without amendment of its
conditions would so greatly violate the correlation of
property interests of the parties under the contract and
would entail such loss for the interested party, that it would
be deprived to a significant degree of that which it had a
right to expect in concluding the contract;
4) business custom or the nature of the agreement does not
indicate that the risk of change in circumstances is borne by
the interested party.
3. In case of rescission of a contract as a result of significantly
changed circumstances, a court, at the petition of either of the
parties, shall determine the consequences of rescission of the
contract, based upon the necessity of fair distribution between the
parties of the expenditures incurred by them in connection with the
performance of this contract.
4. Amendment of a contract in connection with significant
change of circumstances shall be permitted by the decision of a
court in exceptional cases, when rescission of the contract shall
operate against the public interest or would entail loss for the
parties which significantly exceeds the expenditures necessary 60for
performance of the contract under the court-altered conditions.

160.

GKart. 451 (Russ.).
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E. The Italian Civil Code
Article 1467 (Contractsfor Mutual Counterperformance)
In contracts for continuous or periodic performance or for
deferred performance, if extraordinary and unforeseeable events
make the performance of one of the parties excessively onerous,
the party who owes such performance can demand dissolution of
the contract, with the effects set forth in article 1458.
Dissolution cannot be demanded if the supervening
onerousness is part of the normal risk of the contract.
A party against whom dissolution is demanded can avoid it by
offering to modify equitably the conditions of the contract.
Article 1468 (Contractswith Obligationsof One PartyOnly)
In the case contemplated in the preceding article, if the contract
is one in which only one of the parties has assumed obligations, he
can demand a reduction in his performance or a modification of the
manner of performance, sufficient to restore it to an equitable
basis.
Article 1664 (Supervening Hardship or Difficulty in
Performance)
If, as a result of unforeseeable circumstances, there have
occurred such increases or reductions in the cost of the materials or
of labor as to cause an increase or reduction by more than onetenth of the total price agreed upon, the independent contractor or
the customer can request that the price be revised. The revision can
only be granted for that part of the difference which exceeds onetenth.
If in the course of the work difficulties are revealed deriving
from geological conditions, water, or other similar causes not
foreseen by the parties, which made the performance of the
contractor considerably
more onerous, he is entitled to just
16 1
thereof.
compensation

161.

C.C. arts. 1467-68, 1664 (Italy).
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F. The Turkmenistan Civil Code
Article 409. Bringing Contract into Conformity with Changed
Circumstances
1. If circumstances which became the grounds for the
conclusion of a contract have clearly changed after the conclusion
of the contract and the parties would not have concluded it or
would have concluded it with other content, the bringing of the
contract into conformity with the changed circumstances may be
demanded insofar as taking into account individual instances, in
particular, proceeding from the type of norms, strict compliance
with the unchanged contract may not be demanded from the parties
to the contract.
2. To changes of circumstances shall be equated also
instances when conceptions which became the basis of the contract
have turned out to be incorrect.
3. The parties in priority must endeavor to bring the contract
into conformity with the changed circumstances.
4. If bringing the contract into conformity with changed
circumstances is impossible or the other party does not agree with
whose interests have been violated may renounce the
this, the party
62
contract.

1

G. The Uzbekistan Civil Code
Article 383. Change and Dissolution of Contractin Connection
with Material Change of Circumstances
A material change of circumstances from which the parties
proceeded when concluding a contract shall be a grounds for the
change or dissolution thereof unless provided otherwise by the
contract or it follows from the essence thereof.
A change of circumstances shall be deemed to be material
when they have changed such that if the parties could reasonably
foresee this, the contract would not have been concluded at all by
them or it would have been concluded on significantly differing
conditions.

162. TCC art. 409 (Turkm.).
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If the parties have not reached agreement concerning the
bringing of the contract into conformity with the materially
changed circumstances or the dissolution thereof, the contract may
be dissolved, and on the grounds provide for by paragraph five of
the present Article, changed by a court at the demand of the
interested party when the following conditions simultaneously
exist:
(1) at the moment of concluding the contract the parties
proceeded from the fact that such a change of
circumstances would not occur;
(2) the change of circumstances has been caused by reasons
which the interested party could not overcome after they
arose with that degree of good faith and attentiveness
which are required of him by the character of the contract
and the conditions of turnover;
(3) the performance of the contract without a change of its
conditions would so violate correlation of property interests
of the parties which correspond to the contract and entail
for the interested party such damage that it would be
deprived to a significant degree of that which it had the
right to count on when concluding the contract;
(4) it does not follow from the customs of business
turnover or the essence of the contract that the risk of the
change of circumstances is borne by the interested party.
In the event of the dissolution of a contract as a consequence of
materially changed circumstances the court at the demand of any
of the parties shall determine the consequences of the dissolution
of the contract by proceeding from the need for a just distribution
between the parties of the expenses incurred by them in connection
with the performance of this contract.
The change of a contract in connection with a material change
of circumstances shall be permitted by decision of a court in
exceptional instances when dissolution of the contract is contrary
to social interest or entails damage for the parties which
significantly exceeds the costs needed to perform the contract on
the conditions changed by the court.

2008]

COMMENTS

Article 384. Procedure for Change of and Dissolution of
Contract.
An agreement concerning a change of or dissolution of a
contract shall be concluded in the same form as the contract unless
it follows otherwise from legislation, the contract, or the customs
of business turnover.
A demand concerning a change of or dissolution of a contract
may be made by a party in court only after receipt of a refusal of
the other party to the proposal to change or dissolve the contract or
of not receiving a reply within the period specified in the proposal
or established by law or by contract, and in the absence thereof,
within a thirty-day period.
Article 38. Consequences of Dissolution of and Change of
Contract
In the event of the change of a contract, the obligations of the
parties shall be preserved in the changed form.
In the event of the dissolution of the contract the obligations of
the parties shall terminate.
In the event of the change of or the dissolution of a contract,
the obligations shall be considered to be changed or terminated
from the moment of the conclusion of an agreement of the parties
concerning the change of or dissolution of the contract unless it
follows otherwise from the agreement or the character of the
change of the contract, and in the event of the change of or the
dissolution of a contract in a judicial procedure, from the moment
of the entry into legal force of the decision of the court on the
change of or the dissolution of the contract.
The parties shall not have the right to demand the return of that
which was performed by them under the obligation before the
moment of change or dissolution of the contract, unless established
otherwise by a law or by agreement of the parties.
If a material violation of the contract by one of the parties has
served as the grounds for change of or the dissolution of a contract,
the other party shall have the right to demand compensation1 63
of
contract.'
the
of
dissolution
the
or
of
change
losses caused by the

163. RUCC arts. 383-85 (Uzb.).
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H. The Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-615. Excuse by FailureofPresupposedConditions.
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by
a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by
compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it
later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect
only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must
allocate production and deliveries among his customers but
may at his option include regular customers not then under
contract as well as his own requirements for further
manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is
fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there
will be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is
required under paragraph (b),164of the estimated quota thus
made available for the buyer.
L The Restatement (Second)of Contracts
Chapter 1. Impracticabilityof Performanceand Frustrationof
Purpose
§ 261. Dischargeby Supervening Impracticability
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
164.

U.C.C. § 2-615 (2004).
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§ 265. Dischargeby Supervening Frustration
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render
the language or the
performance are discharged, unless
65
circumstances indicate the contrary.'

165.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§ 261,265 (1981).

